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Abstract. Differential privacy is a notion that has emerged in the com-
munity of statistical databases, as a response to the problem of protect-
ing the privacy of the database’s participants when performing statistical
queries. The idea is that a randomized query satisfies differential privacy
if the likelihood of obtaining a certain answer for a database x is not too
different from the likelihood of obtaining the same answer on adjacent
databases, i.e. databases which differ from x for only one individual.
Information flow is an area of Security concerned with the problem of
controlling the leakage of confidential information in programs and pro-
tocols. Nowadays, one of the most established approaches to quantify
and to reason about leakage is based on the Re´nyi min entropy version
of information theory.
In this paper, we analyze critically the notion of differential privacy in
light of the conceptual framework provided by the Re´nyi min informa-
tion theory. We show that there is a close relation between differential
privacy and leakage, due to the graph symmetries induced by the adja-
cency relation. Furthermore, we consider the utility of the randomized
answer, which measures its expected degree of accuracy. We focus on
certain kinds of utility functions called “binary”, which have a close cor-
respondence with the Re´nyi min mutual information. Again, it turns out
that there can be a tight correspondence between differential privacy
and utility, depending on the symmetries induced by the adjacency re-
lation and by the query. Depending on these symmetries we can also
build an optimal-utility randomization mechanism while preserving the
required level of differential privacy. Our main contribution is a study
of the kind of structures that can be induced by the adjacency relation
and the query, and how to use them to derive bounds on the leakage and
achieve the optimal utility.
1 Introduction
Databases are commonly used for obtaining statistical information about their
participants. Simple examples of statistical queries are, for instance, the pre-
dominant disease of a certain population, or the average salary. The fact that
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the answer is publicly available, however, constitutes a threat for the privacy of
the individuals.
In order to illustrate the problem, consider a set of individuals Ind whose
attribute of interest1 has values in Val . A particular database is formed by a
subset of Ind , where a certain value in Val is associated to each participant. A
query is a function f : X → Y, where X is the set of all possible databases, and
Y is the domain of the answers.
For example, let Val be the set of possible salaries and let f represent the
query “what is the average salary of the participants in the database”. In prin-
ciple we would like to consider the global information relative to a database x as
public, and the individual information about a participant i as private. Namely,
we would like to be able to obtain f(x) without being able to infer the salary
of i. However, this is not always possible. In particular, if the number of par-
ticipants in x is known (say n), then the removal of i from the database would
allow to infer i’s salary by querying again the new database x′, and by applying
the formula n f(x) − (n − 1) f(x′). Using an analogous reasoning we can argue
that not only the removal, but also the addition of an individual is a threat for
his privacy.
Another kind of private information we may want to protect is whether an
individual i is participating or not in a database. In this case, if we know for
instance that i earns, say 5K Euros/month, and all the other individuals in Ind
earn less than 4K Euros/month, then knowing that f(x) > 5K Euros/month
will reveal immediately that i is in the database x.
A common solution to the above problems is to introduce some output per-
turbation mechanism based on randomization: instead of the exact answer f(x)
we report a “noisy” answer. Namely, we use some randomized function K which
produces values in some domain2 Z according to some probability distribution
that depends on the input x ∈ X . Of course for certain distributions it may still
be possible to guess the value of an individual with a high probability of success.
The notion of differential privacy, due to Dwork [10,13,11,12], is a proposal to
control the risk of violating privacy for both kinds of threats described above
(value and participation). The idea is to say that K satisfies ǫ-differential pri-
vacy (for some ǫ > 0) if the ratio between the probabilities that two adjacent
databases give the same answer is bound by eǫ, where by “adjacent” we mean
that the databases differ for only one individual (either for the value of an in-
dividual or for the presence/absence of an individual). Often we will abbreviate
“ǫ-differential privacy” as ǫ-d.p.
Obviously, the smaller is ǫ, the greater is the privacy protection. In particu-
lar, when ǫ is close to 0 the output of K is nearly independent from the input
(all distributions are almost equal). Unfortunately, such K is practically useless.
The utility, i.e. the capability to retrieve accurate answers from the reported
1 In general we could be interested in several attributes simultaneously, and in this
case Val would be a set of tuples.
2 The new domain Z may coincide with Y, but not necessarily. It depends on how the
randomization mechanism is defined.
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ones, is the other important characteristic of K, and it is clear that there is a
trade-off between utility and privacy. On the other hand, these two notions are
not the complete opposite of each other, because utility concerns the relation
between the reported answer and the real answer, while privacy is concerns the
relation between the reported answer and the information in the database. This
asymmetry makes more interesting the problem of finding a good compromise
between the two.
At this point, we would like to remark an intriguing analogy between the area
of differential privacy and that of quantitative information flow (QIF), both in
the motivations and in the basic conceptual framework. Information flow is con-
cerned with the leakage of secret information through computer systems, and
the attribute “quantitative” refers to the fact that we are interested in measur-
ing the amount of leakage, not just its occurrence. One of the most established
approaches to QIF is based on information theory: the idea is that a system
is seen as a channel in the information-theoretic sense, where the secret is the
input and the observables are the output. The entropy of the input represents
its vulnerability, i.e. how easy it is for an attacher to guess the secret. We distin-
guish between the a priori entropy (before the observable) and the a posteriori
entropy (given the observable). The difference between the two gives the mutual
information and represents, intuitively, the increase in vulnerability due to the
observables produced by the system, so it is naturally considered as a measure
of the leakage. The notion of entropy is related to the kind of attack we want to
model, and in this paper we focus on the Re´nyi min entropy [18], which repre-
sents the so-called one-try attacks. In recent years there has been a lot of research
aimed at establishing the foundations of this framework [19,7,16,3,5]. It is worth
pointing out that the a posteriori Re´nyi min entropy corresponds to the concept
of Bayes risk, which has also been proposed as a measure of the effectiveness of
attacks [8,6,17].
The analogy hinted above between differential privacy and QIF is based on
the following observations: at the motivational level, the concern about privacy
is akin the concern about information leakage. At the conceptual level, the ran-
domized function K can be seen as an information-theoretic channel, and the
limit case of ǫ = 0, for which the privacy protection is total, corresponds to a
0-capacity channel3 (the rows of the channel matrix are all identical), which does
not allow any leakage. Another promising similarity is that the notion of utility
(in the binary case) corresponds closely to the Bayes risk.
In this paper we investigate the notion of differential privacy, and its impli-
cations, in light of the min-entropy information theoretic framework developed
for QIF. In particular, we wish to explore the following natural questions:
1. Does ǫ-d.p. induce a bound on the information leakage of K?
2. Does ǫ-d.p. induce a bound on the information leakage relative to an indi-
vidual?
3. Does ǫ-d.p. induce a bound on the utility?
3 The channel capacity is the maximum mutual information over all possible input
distributions.
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4. Given f and ǫ, can we construct a K which satisfies ǫ-d.p. and maximum
utility?
We will see that the answers to (1) and (2) are positive, and we provide bounds
that are tight, in the sense that for every ǫ there is a K whose leakage reaches
the bound. For (3) we are able to give a tight bound in some cases which depend
on the structure of the query, and for the same cases, we are able to construct
an oblivious4 K with maximum utility, as requested by (4).
Part of the above results have already appeared in [1], and are based on
techniques which exploit the graph structure that the adjacency relation induces
on the domain of all databases X , and on the domain of the correct answers Y.
The main contribution of this paper is an extension of those techniques, and a
coherent graph-theoretic framework for reasoning about the symmetries of those
domains. More specifically:
– We explore the graph-theoretic foundations of the adjacency relation, and
point out various types of symmetries which allow us to establish a strict
link between differential privacy and information leakage.
– We give a tight bound for the question (2) above, strictly smaller than the
one in [1].
– We extend the structures for which we give a positive answer to the questions
(3) and (4) above. In [1] the only case considered was the class of graphs
with single-orbit automorphisms. Here we show that the results hold also for
regular-distance graphs and a variant of vertex-transtive graphs.
In this paper we focus on the case in which X , Y and Z are finite, leaving
the more general case for future work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Database domain and Differential privacy
Let Ind be a finite set of individuals that may participate in a database and Val
a finite set of possible values for the attribute of interest of these individuals.
In order to capture in a uniform way the presence/absence of an individual in
the database, as well as its value, we enrich the set of possible values with an
element a representing the absence of the individual. Thus the set of all possible
databases is the set X = V Ind , where V = Val ∪ {a}. We will use u and v to
denote the cardinalities of Ind and V , |Ind | and |V |, respectively. Hence we have
that |X | = vu . A database x can be represented as a u-tuple v0v1 . . . vu−1 where
each vi ∈ V is the value of the corresponding individual. Two databases x, x
′
are adjacent (or neighbors), written x ∼ x′, if they differ for the value of exactly
one individual. For instance, for u = 3, v0v1v2 and v0w1v2, with w1 6= v1, are
adjacent. The structure (X ,∼) forms an undirected graph.
4 A randomized function K is oblivious if its probability distribution depends only on
the answer to the query, and not on the database.
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Intuitively, differential privacy is based on the idea that a randomized query
function provides sufficient protection if the ratio between the probabilities of
two adjacent databases to give a certain answer is bound by eǫ, for some given
ǫ > 0. Formally:
Definition 1 ([12]). A randomized function K from X to Z satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy if for all pairs x, x′ ∈ X , with x ∼ x′, and all S ⊆ Z, we have that:
Pr [K(x) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ × Pr [K(x′) ∈ S]
The above definition takes into account the possibility that Z is a continuous
domain. In our case, since Z is finite, the probability distribution is discrete,
and we can rewrite the property of ǫ-d.p. more simply as (using the notation of
conditional probabilities, and considering both quotients):
1
eǫ
≤
Pr [Z = z|X = x]
Pr [Z = z|X = x′]
≤ eǫ for all x, x′ ∈ X with x ∼ x′, and all z ∈ Z
where X and Z represent the random variables associated to X and Z, respec-
tively.
2.2 Information theory and application to information flow
In the following, X,Y denote two discrete random variables with carriers X =
{x0, . . . , xn−1}, Y = {y0, . . . , ym−1}, and probability distributions pX(·), pY (·),
respectively. An information-theoretic channel is constituted by an input X ,
an output Y , and the matrix of conditional probabilities pY |X(· | ·), where
pY |X(y | x) represent the probability that Y is y given that X is x. We shall
omit the subscripts on the probabilities when they are clear from the context.
Re´nyi min-entropy In [18], Re´nyi introduced an one-parameter family of en-
tropy measures, intended as a generalization of Shannon entropy. The Re´nyi
entropy of order α (α > 0, α 6= 1) of a random variable X is defined as
Hα(X) =
1
1−α log2
∑
x∈X p(x)
α. We are particularly interested in the limit
of Hα as α approaches ∞. This is called min-entropy. It can be proven that
H∞(X)
def
= limα→∞Hα(X) = − log2 maxx∈X p(x).
Re´nyi defined also the α-generalization of other information-theoretic no-
tions, like the Kullback-Leibler divergence. However, he did not define the α-
generalization of the conditional entropy, and there is no general agreement on
what it should be. For the case α = ∞, we adopt here the definition of condi-
tional entropy proposed by Smith in [19]:
H∞(X | Y ) = − log2
∑
y∈Y
p(y)max
x∈X
p(x | y) (1)
Analogously to the Shannon case, we can define the Re´nyi-mutual informa-
tion I∞ as H∞(X)−H∞(X | Y ), and the capacity C∞ as maxpX (·) I∞(X ;Y ).
It has been proven in [7] that C∞ is obtained at the uniform distribution, and
that it is equal to the sum of the maxima of each column in the channel matrix,
i.e., C∞ =
∑
y∈Y maxx∈X p(y | x).
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Interpretation in terms of attacks: Re´nyi min-entropy can be related to a model
of adversary who is allowed to ask exactly one question, which must be of the
form “is X = x?” (one-try attacks). More precisely, H∞(X) represents the (log-
arithm of the inverse of the) probability of success for this kind of attacks and
with the best strategy, which consists, of course, in choosing the x with the
maximum probability.
As for H∞(X | Y ), it represents the inverse of the (expected value of the)
probability that the same kind of adversary succeeds in guessing the value of X a
posteriori, i.e. after observing the result of Y . The complement of this probability
is also known as Bayes risk. Since in generalX and Y are correlated, observing Y
increases the probability of success. Indeed we can prove formally that H∞(X |
Y ) ≤ H∞(X), with equality if and only if X and Y are independent. I∞(X ;Y )
corresponds to the ratio between the probabilities of success a priori and a
posteriori, which is a natural notion of leakage. Note that I∞(X ;Y ) ≥ 0, which
seems desirable for a good notion of leakage.
3 Graph symmetries
In this section we explore some classes of graphs that allow us to derive a strict
correspondence between ǫ-d.p. and the a posteriori entropy of the input.
Let us first recall some basic notions. Given a graph G = (V ,∼), the distance
d(v, w) between two vertices v, w ∈ V is the number of edges in a shortest path
connecting them. The diameter of G is the maximum distance between any two
vertices in V . The degree of a vertex is the number of edges incident to it. G is
called regular if every vertex has the same degree. A regular graph with vertices
of degree k is called a k-regular graph. An automorphism of G is a permutation
σ of the vertex set X , such that for any pair of vertices x, x′, if x ∼ x′, then
σ(x) ∼ σ(x′). If σ is an automorphism, and v a vertex, the orbit of v under σ is
the set {v, σ(v), . . . , σk−1(v)} where k is the smallest positive integer such that
σk(v) = v. Clearly, the orbits of the vertices under σ define a partition of V .
The following two definition introduce the classes of graphs that we are in-
terested in. The first class is well known in literature.
Definition 2. Given a graph G = (V ,∼), we say that G is distance-regular if
there exist integers bi, ci, i = 0, ..., d such that for any two vertices v, w in V
with distance i = d(v, w), there are exactly ci neighbors of w in Gi−1(x) and
bi neighbors of v in Gi+1(x), where Gi(x) is the set of vertices y of G with
d(x, y) = i.
Some examples of distance-regular graphs are illustrated in Figure 1.
The next class is a variant of the VT (vertex-transitive) class:
Definition 3. A graph G = (V ,∼) is VT+ (vertex-transitive +) if there are
n automorphisms σ0, σ1, . . .σn−1, where n = |V|, such that, for every vertex
v ∈ V, we have that {σi(v) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1} = V.
6
(a) Tetrahedral
graph
(b) Cubical graph (c) Petersen
graph
Fig. 1. Some distance-regular graphs with degree 3.
In particular, the graphs for which there exists an automorphism σ which in-
duces only one orbit are VT+: in fact it is sufficient to define σi = σ
i for all i from
0 to n− 1. Figure 2 illustrates some graphs with a single-orbit automorphism.
(a) Cycle: degree 2. (b) Degree 4. (c) Clique: degree 5.
Fig. 2. Some VT+ graphs
From graph theory we know that neither of the two classes subsumes the
other. They have however a non-empty intersection, which contains in particular
all the structures of the form (V Ind ,∼), i.e. the database domains.
Proposition 1. The structure (X ,∼) = (V Ind ,∼) is both a distance-regular
graph and a VT+ graph.
Figure 3 illustrates some examples of structures (V Ind ,∼). Note that when
|Ind | = n and |V | = 2, (V Ind ,∼) is the n-dimentional hypercube.
The situation is summarized in Figure 4. We remark that in general the
graphs (V Ind ,∼) do not have a single-orbit automorphism. The only exceptions
are the two simplest structures (|V | = 2, |Ind | ≤ 2).
The two symmetry classes defined above, distance-regular and VT+, will be
used in the next section to transform a generic channel matrix into a matrix
with a symmetric structure, while preserving the a posteriori min entropy and
the ǫ-d.p.. This is the core of our technique to establish the relation between
differential privacy and quantitive information flow, depending on the structure
induced by the database adjacency relation.
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aaaa aaab
abababaa
aaba aabb
abbbabba
baaa baab
bbabbbaa
baba babb
bbbbbbba
(a) |Ind | = 4, V = {a, b} (4-
dimensional hypercube)
aaa
aba
aca
aab
abb
acb
aac
abc
acc
baa
bba
bca
caa
cba
cca bcb
bccccb
ccc
(b) |Ind | = 3, V = {a, b, c} (for read-
ability sake we show only part of the
graph)
Fig. 3. Some (V Ind ,∼) graphs
Dist-regular VT++V Ind
Single-
orbitS
∗
Fig. 4. Venn diagram for the classes of graphs considered in this section. Here, S∗ =
{V Ind | |V | = 2, |Ind| ≤ 2}
4 Deriving the relation between differential privacy and
QIF on the basis of the graph structure
This section contains the main technical contribution of the paper: a general
technique for determining the relation between ǫ-differential privacy and leakage,
and between ǫ-differential privacy and utility, depending on the graph structure
induced by ∼ and f . The idea is to use the symmetries of the graph structure
to transform the channel matrix into an equivalent matrix with certain regular-
ities, which allow to establish the link between ǫ-differential privacy and the a
posteriori min entropy.
Let us illustrate briefly this transformation. Consider a channel whose matrix
M has at least as many columns as rows. First, we transform M into a matrix
M ′ in which each of the first n columns has a maximum in the diagonal, and
the remaining columns are all 0’s. Second, under the assumption that the input
domain is distance-regular or VT+, we transform M ′ into a matrix M ′′ whose
diagonal elements are all the same, and coincide with the maximum element of
M ′′, which we denote here by maxM
′′
. These steps are illustrated in Figure 5.
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M

M0,0 M0,1 . . . M0,m−1
M1,0 M1,1 . . . M1,m−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mn−1,0 Mn−1,1 . . . Mn−1,m−1


Lemma 1
M ′


maxM
′
0 − . . . − 0 . . . 0
− maxM
′
1 . . . − 0 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
− − . . . maxM
′
n−1 0 . . . 0


Lemma 2
(dist-reg)
Lemma 3
(VT++)
M ′′


maxM
′′
− . . . − 0 . . . 0
− maxM
′′
. . . − 0 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
− − . . . maxM
′′
0 . . . 0


Fig. 5. Matrix transformations for distance-regular and VT+ graphs
We are now going to present formally our the technique. Let us first fix
some notation: In the rest of this section we consider channels with input A and
output B, with carriersA and B respectively, and we assume that the probability
distribution of A is uniform. Furthermore, we assume that |A| = n ≤ |B| = m.
We also assume an adjacency relation ∼ on A, i.e. that (A,∼) is an undirected
graph structure. With a slight abuse of notation, we will also write i ∼ h when
i and h are associated to adjacent elements of A, and we will write d(i, h) to
denote the distance between the elements of A associated to i and h.
We note that a channel matrixM satisfies ǫ-d.p. if for each column j and for
each pair of rows i and h such that i ∼ h we have that:
1
eǫ
≤
Mi,j
Mh,j
≤ eǫ.
The a posteriori entropy of a channel with matrixM will be denoted byHM∞ (A|B).
Next Lemma is relative to the first step of the transformation.
Lemma 1. Consider a channel with matrix M . Assume that M satisfies ǫ-d.p..
Then it is possible to transform M into a matrix M ′ such that:
– Each of the first n columns has a maximum in the diagonal, i.e. M ′i,i =
maxM
′
i = maxhM
′
h,i for each i from 0 to n− 1.
– The rest of the columns contain only 0’s, i.e. M ′i,j = 0 for each i from 0 to
n− 1 and each j from n to m− 1.
– M ′ satisfies ǫ-d.p.
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– HM
′
∞ (A|B) = H
M
∞ (A|B).
Next lemma is relative to the second step of the transformation, for the case
of distance-regular graphs.
Lemma 2. Consider a channel with matrixM ′. Assume thatM ′ satisfies ǫ-d.p.,
and the first n columns have maxima in the diagonal, and the rest of the columns
contain only 0’s. Assume that (A,∼) is distance-regular. Then it is possible to
transform M ′ into a matrix M ′′ such that:
– The elements of the diagonal are all the same, and are equal to the maximum
of the matrix, i.e. M ′′i,i = max
M ′′ = maxh,iM
′′
h,i for each i from 0 to n− 1.
– The rest of the columns contain only 0’s.
– M ′′ satisfies ǫ-d.p.
– HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = H
M ′
∞ (A|B).
Next lemma is relative to the second step of the transformation, for the case
of VT+ graphs.
Lemma 3. Consider a channel with matrix M ′ satisfying the assumptions of
Lemma 2, except for the assumption about distance-regularity, which we replace
by the assumption that (A,∼) is VT+. Then it is possible to transform M ′ into
a matrix M ′′ with the same properties as in Lemma 2.
Note that the fact that inM ′′ the diagonal elements are all equal to the maximum
maxM
′′
implies that HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = max
M ′′ .
Once we have a matrix with the properties ofM ′′, we can use again the graph
structure of A to determine a bound on HM
′′
∞ (A|B).
First we note that the property of ǫ-d.p. induces a relation between the ratio
of elements at any distance:
Remark 1. Let M be a matrix satisfying ǫ-d.p.. Then, for any column j, and
any pair of rows i and h we have that:
1
eǫ d(i,h)
≤
Mi,j
Mh,j
≤ eǫ d(i,h)
In particular, if we know that the diagonal elements of M are equal to the
maximum element maxM , then for each element Mi,j we have that:
Mi,j ≥
maxM
eǫ d(i,j)
(2)
Let us fix a row, say row r. For each distance d from 0 to the diameter of
the graph, let nd be the number of elements Mr,j that are at distance d from
the corresponding diagonal element Mj,j, i.e. such that d(r, j) = d. (Clearly, nd
depends on the structure of the graph.) Since the elements of the row i represent
a probability distribution, we obtain the following dis-equation:
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maxM
∑
d
nd
eǫ d
≤ 1
from which we derive immediately a bound on the min a-posteriori entropy.
Putting together all the steps of this section, we obtain our main result.
Theorem 1. Consider a matrixM , and let r be a row ofM . Assume that (A,∼)
is either distance-regular or VT+, and that M satisfies ǫ-d.p. For each distance
d from 0 to the diameter of (A,∼), let nd be the number of nodes j at distance
d from r. Then we have that:
HM∞ (A|B) ≥ − log2
1∑
d
nd
eǫ d
(3)
Note that this bound is tight, in the sense that we can build a matrix for which
(3) holds with equality. It is sufficient to define each element Mi,j according to
(2) (with equality instead of dis-equality, of course).
In the next section, we will see how to use this theorem for establishing a
bound on the leakage and on the utility.
5 Application to leakage
As already hinted in the introduction, we can regardK as a channel with input X
and output Z. From Proposition 1 we know that (X ,∼) is both distance-regular
and VT+, we can therefore apply Theorem 1. Let us fix a particular database
x ∈ X . The number of databases at distance d from x is
nd =
(
u
d
)
(v − 1)d (4)
where u = |Ind | and v = V . In fact, recall that x can be represented as a u-tuple
with values in V . We need to select d individuals in the u-tuple and then change
their values, and each of them can be changed in v − 1 different ways.
Using the nd from (4) in Theorem 1 we obtain a binomial expansion in the
denominator, namely:
HM∞ (X |Z) ≥ − log2
1
u∑
d=0
(
u
d
)
(v − 1)d
eǫ(u−d)
eǫ u
= −u log2
eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
which gives the following result:
Theorem 2. If K satisfies ǫ-d.p., then for the uniform input distribution the
information leakage is bound from above as follows:
I∞(X ;Z) ≤ u log2
v eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
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K (ǫ-Diff. priv. randomized function)
X
Dataset
Query
f
Y
Real answer
Randomization
mechanism
H
Z
Reported answer
Utility
Leakage
Fig. 6. Schema of an oblivious randomized function
We consider now the leakage for a single individual. Let us fix a database x,
and a particular individual i in Ind . The possible ways in which we can change
the value of i in x are v − 1. All the new databases obtained in this way are
adjacent to each other, i.e. the graph structure associated to the input is a clique
of v nodes. Therefore we obtain nd = 1 for d = 0, nd = v − 1 for d = 1, and
nd = 0 otherwise. By substituting this value of nd in Theorem 1, we get
Hind∞ (Val |Z) ≥ − log2
1
1 +
v − 1
eǫ
= − log2
eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
which leads to the following result:
Proposition 2. Assume that K satisfies ǫ-d.p.. Then for the uniform distri-
bution on V the information leakage for an individual is bound from above as
follows:
Iind∞ (Val ;B) ≤ log2
v eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
Note that the bound on the leakage for an individual does not depend on the
size of Ind , nor on the database x that we fix.
6 Application to utility
We turn now our attention to the issue of utility. We focus on the case in which
K is oblivious, which means that it depends only on the (exact) answer to the
query, i.e. on the value of f(x), and not on x.
An oblivious function can be decomposed in the concatenation of two chan-
nels, one representing the function f , and the other representing the randomiza-
tion mechanism H added as output perturbation. The situation is illustrated in
Figure 6.
The standard way to define utility is by means of guess and gain functions.
The functionality of the first is guess : Z → Y, and it represents the user’s
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strategy to retrieve the correct answer form the reported one. The functionality
of the latter is gain : Y ×Y → R. the value gain(y, y′) represents the reward for
guessing the answer y when the correct answer is y′. The utility U can then be
defined as the expected gain:
U(Y, Z) =
∑
y,z
p(y, z) gain(guess(z), y)
We focus here on the so-called binary gain function, which is defined as
gain(y, y′) =
{
1 if y = y′
0 otherwise
This kind of function represents the case in which there is no reason to prefer
an answer over the other, except if it is the right answer. More precisely, we get
a gain if and only if we guess the right answer.
If the gain function is binary, and the guess function represents the user’s
best strategy, i.e. it is chosen to optimize utility, then there is a well-known
correspondence between U and the Bayes risk / the a posteriori min entropy.
Such correspondence is expressed by the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Assume that gain is binary and guess is optimal. Then:
U(Y, Z) =
∑
z
max
y
(p(z|y) p(y)) = 2−H∞(Y |Z)
In order to analyze the implications of the ǫ-d.p. requirement on the utility,
we need to consider the structure that the adjacency relation induces on Y. Let
us define ∼ on Y as follows: y ∼ y′ if there are x, x′ ∈ X such that y = f(x),
y′ = f(x′), and x ∼ x,. Note that K satisfies ǫ-d.p. if and only if H satisfies
ǫ-d.p.
If (Y,∼) is distance-regular or VT+, then we can apply Theorem 1 to find a
bound on the utility. In the following, we assume that the distribution of Y is
uniform.
Theorem 3. Consider a randomized mechanism H, and let y be an element of
Y. Assume that (Y,∼) is either distance-regular or VT+ and that H satisfies
ǫ-d.p. For each distance d from 0 to the diameter of (Y,∼), let nd be the number
of nodes y′ at distance d from y. Then we have that:
U(Y, Z) ≤
1∑
d
nd
eǫ d
(5)
The above bound is tight, in the sense that (provided (Y,∼) is distance-
regular or VT+) we can construct a mechanism H which satisfies (5) with equal-
ity. More precisely, define
c =
1∑
d
nd
eǫ d
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Then define H (here identified with its channel matrix for simplicity) as follows:
Hi,j =
c
eǫ d(i,j)
(6)
Theorem 4. Assume (Y,∼) is distance-regular or VT+. Then the matrix H
defined in (6) satisfies ǫ-d.p. and has maximal utility:
U(Y, Z) =
1∑
d
nd
eǫ d
Note that we can always define H as in (6): the matrix so defined will be
a legal channel matrix, and it will satisfy ǫ-d.p.. However, if (Y,∼) is neither
distance-regular nor VT+, then the utility of such H is not necessarily optimal.
We end this section with an example (borrowed from [1]) to illustrate our
technique.
Example 1. Consider a database with electoral information where each row cor-
responds to a voter and contains the following three fields:
– Id : a unique (anonymized) identifier assigned to each voter;
– City: the name of the city where the user voted;
– Candidate: the name of the candidate the user voted for.
Consider the query “What is the city with the greatest number of votes for
a given candidate cand?”. For such a query the binary utility function is the
natural choice: only the right city gives some gain, and all wrong answers are
equally bad. It is easy to see that every two answers are neighbors, i.e. the graph
structure of the answers is a clique.
Let us consider the scenario where City = {A,B,C,D,E, F} and assume for
simplicity that there is a unique answer for the query, i.e., there are no two cities
with exactly the same number of individuals voting for candidate cand . Table 1
shows two alternative mechanisms providing ǫ-differential privacy (with ǫ =
log 2). The first one,M1, is based on the truncated geometric mechanism method
used in [14] for counting queries (here extended to the case where every pair of
answers is neighbor). The second mechanism, M2, is obtained by applying the
definition (6). From Theorem 4 we know that for the uniform input distribution
M2 gives optimal utility.
For the uniform input distribution, it is easy to see that U(M1) = 0.2242 <
0.2857 = U(M2). Even for non-uniform distributions, our mechanism still pro-
vides better utility. For instance, for p(A) = p(F ) = 1/10 and p(B) = p(C) =
p(D) = P (E) = 1/5, we have U(M1) = 0.2412 < 0.2857 = U(M2). This is not
too surprising: the geometric mechanism, as well as the Laplacian mechanism
proposed by Dwork, perform very well when the domain of answers is provided
with a metric and the utility function is not binary5. It also works well when
5 In the metric case the gain function can take into account the proximity of the
reported answer to the real one, the idea being that a close answer, even if wrong,
is better than a distant one.
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(a) M1: truncated geometric mechanism
In/Out A B C D E F
A 0.535 0.060 0.052 0.046 0.040 0.267
B 0.465 0.069 0.060 0.053 0.046 0.307
C 0.405 0.060 0.069 0.060 0.053 0.353
D 0.353 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.060 0.405
E 0.307 0.046 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.465
F 0.267 0.040 0.046 0.052 0.060 0.535
(b) M2: our mechanism
In/Out A B C D E F
A 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
B 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
C 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
D 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7
E 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7
F 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7
Table 1. Mechanisms for the city with higher number of votes for candidate cand
(Y,∼) has low connectivity, in particular in the cases of a ring and of a line. But
in this example, we are not in these cases, because we are considering binary
gain functions and high connectivity.
7 Related work
As far as we know, the first work to investigate the relation between differential
privacy and information-theoretic leakage for an individual was [2]. In this work,
a channel is relative to a given database x, and the channel inputs are all possible
databases adjacent to x. Two bounds on leakage were presented, one for teh
Re´nyi min entropy, and one for Shannon entropy. Our bound in Proposition 2
is an improvement with respect to the (Re´nyi min entropy) bound in [2].
Barthe and Ko¨pf [4] were the first to investigates the (more challenging)
connection between differential privacy and the Re´nyi min-entropy leakage for
the entire universe of possible databases. They consider the “end-to-end differ-
entially private mechanisms”, which correspond to what we call K in our paper,
and propose, like we do, to interpret them as information-theoretic channels.
They provide a bound for the leakage, but point out that it is not tight in gen-
eral, and show that there cannot be a domain-independent bound, by proving
that for any number of individual u the optimal bound must be at least a cer-
tain expression f(u, ǫ). Finally, they show that the question of providing optimal
upper bounds for the leakage of ǫ-differentially private randomized functions in
terms of rational functions of ǫ is decidable, and leave the actual function as an
open question. In our work we used rather different techniques and found (inde-
pendently) the same function f(u, ǫ) (the bound in Theorem 1), but we actually
proved that f(u, ǫ) is the optimal bound6. Another difference is that [4] captures
the case in which the focus of differential privacy is on hiding participation of
individuals in a database. In our work, we consider both the participation and
the values of the participants.
Clarkson and Schneider also considered differential privacy as a case study
of their proposal for quantification of integrity [9]. There, the authors analyze
6 When discussing our result with Barthe and Ko¨pf, they said that they also conjec-
tured that f(u, ǫ) is the optimal bound.
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database privacy conditions from the literature (such as differential privacy, k-
anonymity, and l-diversity) using their framework for utility quantification. In
particular, they study the relationship between differential privacy and a notion
of leakage (which is different from ours - in particular their definition is based
on Shannon entropy) and they provide a tight bound on leakage.
Heusser and Malacaria [15] were among the first to explore the application
of information-theoretic concepts to databases queries. They proposed to model
database queries as programs, which allows for statical analysis of the informa-
tion leaked by the query. However [15] did not attempt to relate information
leakage to differential privacy.
In [14] the authors aim at obtaining optimal-utility randomization mecha-
nisms while preserving differential privacy. The authors propose adding noise to
the output of the query according to the geometric mechanism. Their frame-
work is very interesting in the sense it provides a general definition of utility
for a mechanism M that captures any possible side information and preference
(defined as a loss function) the users of M may have. They prove that the ge-
ometric mechanism is optimal in the particular case of counting queries. Our
results in Section 6 do not restrict to counting queries, but on the other hand
we only consider the case of binary loss function.
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have investigated the relation between ǫ-differential privacy and
leakage, and between ǫ-differential privacy and utility. Our main contribution is
the development of a general technique for determining these relations depending
on the graph structure induced by the adjacency relation and by the query. We
have considered two particular structures, the distance-regular graphs, and the
VT+ graphs, which allow to obtain tight bounds on the leakage and on the utility,
and to construct the optimal randomization mechanism satisfying ǫ-differential
privacy.
As future work, we plan to extend our result to other kinds of utility func-
tions. In particular, we are interested in the case in which the the answer domain
is provided with a metric, and we are interested in taking into account the degree
of accuracy of the inferred answer.
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Fig. 1. Model of leakage and utility
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Fig. 3. Hypercube
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Fig. 4. A VT++ graph without a single-orbit automorphism
(a) Cycle (b) Intermediate (c) Clique
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Fig. 6. Partial view of the V Ind graph
3
Dist-regular VT++V Ind
Single-
orbitS
∗
Fig. 7. Venn diagram for the types of graphs, where S∗ = {V Ind | |V | = 2, |Ind| ≤ 2}
(a) Tetrahedral graph (b) Cubical graph (c) Petersen graph
Fig. 8. Some distance-regular graphs
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